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Abstract. The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), in-
troduced by Smith and Price [4], is a refinement of Nash equilibrium
in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natu-
ral phenomena, whose existence is not guaranteed in every game. The
problem of deciding whether a game possesses an ESS has been shown
to be ΣP2 -complete by Conitzer [1] using the preceding important work
by Etessami and Lochbihler [2]. The latter, among other results, proved
that deciding the existence of ESS is both NP-hard and coNP-hard. In
this paper we introduce a reduction robustness notion and we show that
deciding the existence of an ESS remains coNP-hard for a wide range
of games even if we arbitrarily perturb within some intervals the pay-
off values of the game under consideration. In contrast, ESS exist almost
surely for large games with random and independent payoffs chosen from
the same distribution [10].
Keywords: Game theory, Computational complexity, Evolutionarily sta-
ble strategies, Robust reduction
1 Introduction
1.1 Concepts of Evolutionary Games and Stable Strategies
Evolutionary game theory has proven itself to be invaluable when it comes to
analysing complex natural phenomena. A first attempt to apply game theoretic
tools to evolution was made by Lewontin [3] who saw the evolution of genetic
mechanisms as a game played between a species and nature. He argued that a
species would adopt the “maximin” strategy, i.e. the strategy which gives it the
best chance of survival if nature does its worst. Subsequently, his ideas where
improved by the seminal work of Smith and Price in [4] and Smith in [11] where
the study of natural selection’s processes through game theory was triggered.
They proposed a model in order to decide the outcome of groups consisting of
living individuals, conflicting in a specific environment.
The key insight of evolutionary game theory is that a set of behaviours de-
pends on the interaction among multiple individuals in a population, and the
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prosperity of any one of these individuals depends on that interaction of its
own behaviour with that of the others. An evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) is defined as follows: An infinite population consists of two types of infi-
nite groups with the same set of pure strategies; the incumbents, that play the
(mixed) strategy s and the mutants, that play the (mixed) strategy t 6= s. The
ratio of mutants over the total population is . A pair of members of the total
population is picked uniformly at random to play a finite symmetric bimatrix
game Γ with payoff matrix AΓ . Strategy s is an ESS if for every t 6= s there
exists a constant ratio t of mutants over the total population, such that, if  < t
the expected payoff of an incumbent versus a mutant is strictly greater than the
expected payoff of a mutant versus a mutant. For convenience, we say that “s is
an ESS of the game Γ”.
The concept of ESS tries to capture resistance of a population against in-
vaders. This concept has been studied in two main categories: infinite population
groups and finite population groups. The former was the one where this Nash
equilibrium refinement was first defined and presented by [4]. The latter was
studied by Schaffer [9] who shows that the finite population case is a general-
ization of the infinite population one. The current paper deals with the infinite
population case which can be mathematically modelled in an easier way and in
addition, its results may provide useful insight for the finite population case.
An example. In order for the reader to conceive the notion of the evolutionarily
stable strategy, we give a most explanatory example of the infinite population
case. Let us consider a particular species of crab and suppose that each crab’s
fitness in a specific environment is mainly decided by its capability to find food
and use the nutrients from the food in an efficient way. In our crab population
a particular mutation makes its appearance, so the crabs born with the muta-
tion grow a significantly larger body size. We can picture the population now,
consisting of two distinct kinds of crabs;  fraction of the population being the
large ones and 1 −  being the small ones. The large crabs, in fact, have dif-
ficulty maintaining the metabolic requirements of their larger body structure,
meaning that they need to divert more nutrients from the food they eat and as
a consequence, they experience a negative effect on fitness. However, the large
crabs have an advantage when it comes to conflicting with the small ones, so
they claim an above-average share of the food. To make our framework simple,
we will assume that food competition involves pairs of crabs, drawn at random,
interacting with each other once, but the reasoning of the analysis is equivalent
to interactions that occur (simultaneously or not) between every possible pair,
with each individual receiving the mean of the total fitness. When two crabs
compete for food, we have the following “rules” that apply: (1) When crabs of
the same body size compete, they get equal shares of the food. (2) When a large
crab competes with a small crab, the large one gets the majority of the food. (3)
In all cases, large crabs experience less of a fitness benefit from a given quantity
of food, since some of it is diverted into maintaining their expensive metabolism.
(4) When two large crabs compete they experience even less of a fitness benefit
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as they put considerable effort in fighting. The following bimatrix encloses the
rules above in the context of a game.
Crab 1
Crab 2
Small Large
Small 7, 7 1, 9
Large 9, 1 4, 4
In this setting, we call a given strategy evolutionarily stable if, when the
whole population is using this strategy, any small enough group of invaders
using a different strategy will eventually die off over multiple generations. This
idea is captured in terms of numerical payoffs by saying that, when the entire
population is using a strategy s, then an arbitrarily small ratio of invaders over
the new (blended) population will have strictly lower fitness than the initial
population has in the new population. Since fitness translates into reproductive
success, and consequently transmitting ones genes to future generations at higher
frequencies, strictly lower fitness is assumed by evolutionary principles [4] that
the reason for a subpopulation (like the users of strategy t) to shrink over time
through multiple generations and eventually become extinct.
Let us see if any of the two pure strategies is evolutionarily stable. Suppose
a population of small crabs gets invaded by a group of large ones (of ratio  over
the whole population). The expected payoff (fitness) of a small crab is:
7(1− ) + 1 = 7− 6 because it meets a small crab with probability
1−  and a large one with probability .
The expected payoff of a large crab is:
9(1− ) + 4 = 9− 5 because it meets a small crab with probability
1−  and a large one with probability .
Clearly, no  can make the payoff of the small crabs greater than that of the large
ones. So, the pure strategy Small is not an ESS. Now suppose a population of
large crabs gets invaded by a group of small ones (of ratio  over the whole
population). The expected payoff (fitness) of a large crab is:
4(1− ) + 9 = 4 + 5 because it meets a large crab with probability
1−  and a small one with probability .
The expected payoff of a small crab is:
1(1− ) + 7 = 1 + 6 because it meets a large crab with probability
1−  and a small one with probability .
In this case, for every  ∈ (0, 1) the payoff of the large crabs is greater than that
of the small ones. So, the pure strategy Large is an ESS.
The concept of ESSs can also be extended to mixed strategies. We can think of
three natural ways to interpret the notion of probability assignment on the pure
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strategies of a population. One is, each individual is preprogrammed (through
its DNA) to play just a specific pure strategy from a set of strategies and we say
that individuals with the same pure strategy are of the same type. The group
of individuals can be considered to behave as a player with a mixed strategy,
defined as a probability vector over the pure strategies used by the group. Each
pure strategy’s probability equals the ratio of its type’s members over the total
population (type’s frequency), because of the simple assumption made, that
when two groups conflict one individual from each group is drawn equiprobably
to play a bimatrix game. Another one is, each individual is preprogrammed to
play a particular mixed strategy. Thus, whoever is drawn will play the specific
mixed strategy. The last one is the most general way to think of it, as a blend
of the former cases. A group’s mixed strategy is defined by its probabilities over
the available pure strategies. As soon as one individual is equiprobably picked
from each group, the probability over a pure strategy of a group is determined
by the sum of the probability each type is picked times the probability this
type plays the specific pure strategy. Referring to our previous example, the
following three infinite populations of crabs are equivalent: (i) One with 2/3 of
type Small and 1/3 of type Large. (ii) One with every crab playing the mixed
strategy [2/3: Small, 1/3: Large]. (iii) One with 1/4 of type Small, 1/4 playing
the mixed strategy [1/6: Small, 5/6: Large] and 1/2 playing the mixed strategy
[3/4: Small, 1/4: Large]. Of course in the particular example the individuals
cannot have mixed strategies, each one is committed to have a body size for life,
but the reasoning holds for other games with strategies that do not exclude each
other such as in the Stag-Hunt game. We should mention here, that some games
such as Hawk-Dove do not have a pure ESS, but they have a mixed ESS. Other
games do not have either.
1.2 Previous Work
Searching for the exact complexity of deciding if a bimatrix game possesses an
ESS, Etessami and Lochbihler [2] invent a nice reduction from the complement
of the clique problem to a specific game with an appointed ESS, showing that
the ess problem is coNP-hard. They also accomplish a reduction from the sat
problem to ess, thus proving that ess is NP-hard too. This makes impossible
for the ess to be NP-complete, unless NP=coNP. Furthermore, they pro-
vide a proof for the general ess being contained in ΣP2 , the second level of the
polynomial-time hierarchy, leaving open the question of what is the complexity
class in which the problem is complete.
A further improvement of those results was made by Nisan [7], showing that,
given a payoff matrix, the existence of a mixed ESS is coDP-hard. DP is the
complexity class, introduced by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [8], consisting of
all languages L where L = L1∩L2 and L1 is in NP and L2 is in coNP. Therefore,
coDP is the complexity class consisting of all the complement languages of L,
denoted by L¯, where L¯ = L¯1 ∪ L¯2 and L¯1 is in coNP and L¯2 is in NP. Clearly,
NP ⊆ coDP , coNP ⊆ coDP and coDP ⊆ ΣP2 . The hardness result is due
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to a relatively simple reduction from the coDP-complete problem co-exact-
clique(for the definition see [8]), to ess. A notable consequence of both [2]
and [7] is that the problem of recognizing a mixed ESS, once given along with the
payoff matrix, is coNP-complete. However, the question of the exact complexity
of ESS existence, given the payoff matrix, remained open. A few years later,
Conitzer finally settles this question in [1], showing that ess is actually ΣP2 -
complete.
On the contrary, Hart et al. [10] showed that if the symmetric bimatrix game
defined by a n× n payoff matrix with elements independently randomly chosen
according to a distribution F with exponential and faster decreasing tail, such
as exponential, normal or uniform, then the probability of having an ESS with
just 2 pure strategies in the support tends to 1 as n tends to infinity. In view
of this result, and since the basic reduction of [2] used only 3 payoff values, it is
interesting to consider whether ESS existence remains hard for arbitrary payoffs
in some intervals.
1.3 Our Results
In the reduction of Etessami and Lochbihler that proves coNP-hardness of ess
the values of the payoffs used, are 0, k−1k and 1, for k ∈ N. A natural question
is if the hardness results hold when we arbitrarily perturb the payoff values
within respective intervals (in the spirit of smoothed analysis [12]). In our work
we extend the aforementioned reduction and show that the specific reduction
remains valid even after significant changes of the payoff values.
We can easily prove that the evolutionarily stable strategies of a symmetric
bimatrix game remain the exact same if we add, subtract or multiply (or do all
of them) with a positive value its payoff matrix. However, that kind of value
modification forces the entries of the payoff matrix to change in an entirely
correlated manner, hence it does not provide an answer to our question. In
this work, we prove that if we have partitions of entries of the payoff matrix
with the same value for each partition, independent arbitrary perturbations of
those values within certain intervals do not affect the validity of our reduction.
In other words, we prove that determining ESS existence remains hard even if
we perturb the payoff values associated with the reduction. En route we give
a definition of “reduction robustness under arbitrary perturbations” and show
how the reduction under examination adheres to this definition.
In contrast, [10] show that if the payoffs of a symmetric game are random
and independently chosen from the same distribution F with “exponential or
faster decreasing tail” (e.g. exponential, normal or uniform), then an ESS (with
support of size 2) exists with probability that tends to 1 when n tends to infinity.
One could superficially get a non-tight version of our result by saying that
(under supposed continuity assumptions in the ESS definition) any small pertur-
bation of the payoff values will not destroy the reduction. However, in such a case
(a) the continuity assumptions have to be precisely stated and (b) this does not
explain why the ESS problem becomes easy when the payoffs are random [10].
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In fact, the value of our technique is, firstly, to get as tight as possible ranges
of the perturbation that preserve the reduction (and the ESS hardness) without
any continuity assumptions, secondly, to indicate the basic difference from ran-
dom payoff values (which is exactly the notion of partition of payoffs into groups
in our definition of robustness, and the allowance of arbitrary perturbation within
some interval in each group), and finally, the ranges of the allowed perturbations
that we determine are quite tight. For the reduction to be preserved when we
independently perturb the values (in each of our partitions arbitrarily), one must
show that a system of inequalities has always a feasible solution, and we manage
to show this in our final theorem. Our result seems to indicate that existence of
an ESS remains hard despite a smoothed analysis [12].
An outline of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we define the robust
reduction notion and we provide a first extension of the aforementioned reduction
by [2]. In Section 3 we provide another extended reduction, based on the one
from [2], that is essentially modified in order to be robust. In Section 4 we give
our main result and Section 5 refers to further work and conclusions.
1.4 Definitions and Notation
Background from game theory. A finite two-player strategic form game
Γ = (S1, S2, u1, u2) is given by finite sets of pure strategies S1 and S2 and
utility, or payoff, functions u1 : S1 × S2 7→ R and u2 : S1 × S2 7→ R for the
row-player and the column-player, respectively. Such a game is called symmetric
if S1 = S2 =: S and u1(i, j) = u2(j, i) for all i, j ∈ S.
In what follows, we are only concerned with finite symmetric two-player
strategic form games, so we write (S, u1) as shorthand for (S, S, u1, u2), with
u2(j, i) = u1(i, j) for all i, j ∈ S. For simplicity assume S = 1, ..., n, i.e., pure
strategies are identified with integers i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The row-player’s payoff matrix
AΓ = (ai,j) of Γ = (S, u1) is given by ai,j = u1(i, j) for i, j ∈ S, so BΓ =
ATΓ is the payoff matrix of the column-player. Note that AΓ is not necessarily
symmetric, even if Γ is a symmetric game.
A mixed strategy s = (s(1), ..., s(n))T for Γ = (S, u1) is a vector that defines
a probability distribution on s and, in the sequel, we will denote by s(i) the
probability assigned by strategy s on the pure strategy i ∈ S. Thus, s ∈ X,
where X =
{
s ∈ Rn≥0 :
∑n
i=1 s(i) = 1
}
denotes the set of mixed strategies in Γ ,
with Rn≥0 denoting the set of non-negative real number vectors (x1, x2, .., xn). s
is called pure iff s(i) = 1 for some i ∈ S. In that case we identify s with i. For
brevity, we generally use “strategy” to refer to a mixed strategy s, and indicate
otherwise when the strategy is pure. In our notation, we alternatively view a
mixed strategy s as either a vector (s1, ..., sn)
T , or as a function s : S 7→ R,
depending on which is more convenient in the context.
The expected payoff function, Uk : X × X 7→ R for player k ∈ 1, 2 is given
by Uk(s, t) =
∑
i,j∈S s(i)t(j)uk(i, j), for all s, t ∈ X. Note that U1(s, t) = sTAΓ t
and U2(s, t) = s
TATΓ t. Let s be a strategy for Γ = (S, u1). A strategy t ∈ X
is a best response to s if U1(t, s) = maxt′∈X U1(t′, s). The support supp(s) of s
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is the set {i ∈ S : s(i) > 0} of pure strategies which are played with non-zero
probability. The extended support ext-supp(s) of s is the set {i ∈ S : U1(i, s) =
maxx∈X U1(x, s)} of all pure best responses to s.
A pair of strategies (s, t) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for Γ if s is a best
response to t and t is a best response to s. Note that (s, t) is a NE if and only
if supp(s)⊆ ext-supp(t) and supp(t)⊆ ext-supp(s). A NE (s, t) is symmetric if
s = t.
Definition 1 (Symmetric Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile (s, s) is a
symmetric NE for the symmetric bimatrix game Γ = (S, u1) if s
TAΓ s ≥ tTAΓ s
for every t ∈ X.
A definition of ESS equivalent to that presented in Subsection 1.1 is:
Definition 2 (Evolutionarily stable strategy). A (mixed) strategy s ∈ X
is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a two-player symmetric game Γ if:
1. (s, s) is a symmetric NE of Γ , and
2. if t ∈ X is any best response to s and t 6= s, then U1(s, t) > U1(t, t).
Due to [6], we know that every symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equi-
librium. The same does not hold for evolutionarily stable strategies (for example
“rock-paper-scissors” does not have any pure or mixed ESS).
Definition 3 (ess problem). Given a symmetric two-player normal-form game
Γ , we are asked whether there exists an evolutionarily stable strategy of Γ .
Background from graph theory. An undirected graph G is an ordered pair
(V,E) consisting of a set V of vertices and a set E, disjoint from V , of edges,
together with an incidence function ψG that associates with each edge of G an
unordered pair of distinct vertices of G. If e is an edge and u and υ are vertices
such that ψG(e) = {u, υ}, then e is said to join u and υ, and the vertices u and
υ are called the ends of e. We denote the numbers of vertices and edges in G by
υ(G) and e(G); these two basic parameters are called the order and size of G,
respectively.
Definition 4 (Adjacency matrix). The adjacency matrix of the above undi-
rected graph G is the n × n matrix AG := (auυ), where auυ is the number of
edges joining vertices u and υ and n = υ(G).
Definition 5 (Clique). A clique of an undirected graph G is a complete sub-
graph of G, i.e. one whose vertices are joined with each other by edges.
Definition 6 (clique problem). Given an undirected graph G and a number
k, we are asked whether there is a clique of size k.
As mentioned earlier, in what follows, Rn≥0 denotes the set of non-negative
real number vectors (x1, x2, .., xn) and n = |V |.
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Theorem 1 (Motzkin and Straus [5]). Let G = (V,E) be an undirected
graph with maximum clique size d. Let ∆1 =
{
x ∈ Rn≥0 :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1
}
. Then
maxx∈∆1 x
TAGx =
d−1
d .
Corollary 1. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with maximum clique size
d. Let Aτ,ρG be a modified adjacency matrix of graph G where its entries with
value 0 are replaced by τ ∈ R and its entries with value 1 are replaced by ρ ∈ R.
Let ∆1 =
{
x ∈ Rn≥0 :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1
}
. Then maxx∈∆1 x
TAτ,ρG x = τ + (ρ− τ)d−1d .
Proof.
xTAτ,ρG x = x
T [τ · 1 + (ρ− τ) ·AG]x , where 1 is the n× n matrix with value 1
in every entry.
= τ + (ρ− τ) · xTAGx , and by Theorem 1 the result follows.
uunionsq
Corollary 2 (Etessami and Lochbihler [2]). Let G = (V,E) be an undi-
rected graph with maximum clique size d and let l ∈ R≥0. Let ∆l =
{
x ∈ Rn≥0 :∑n
i=1 xi = l
}
. Then maxx∈∆l x
TAGx =
d−1
d l
2.
2 Robust Reductions
Definition 7 (Neighbourhood). Let v ∈ R. An (open) interval I(v) = [a, b]
(I(v) = (a, b)) with a < b where a ≤ v ≤ b, is called a neighbourhood of v of
range |b− a|.
Definition 8 (Robust reduction under arbitrary perturbations of val-
ues). We are given a valid reduction of a problem to a strategic game that
involves a real matrix A of payoffs as entries aij. A consists of m partitions,
with each partition’s entries having the same value v(t), for t ∈ {1, 2, ...m}. Let
I(v(t)) 6= ∅ be a neighbourhood of v(t) and w(t) ∈ I(v(t)) be an arbitrary value in
that neighbourhood. The reduction is called robust under arbitrary perturbations
of values if it is valid for all the possible matrices W with entries w(t).
2.1 A First Extension of the Reduction from the Complement of
the clique Problem to ess
In the sequel we extend the idea of K. Etessami and A. Lochbihler [2] by giving
sufficient conditions in order for the reduction to hold. We replace the zeros and
ones of their reduction with τ > 0 and ρ < 1 respectively.
Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) we construct the following game
Γk,τ,ρ(G) = (S, u1) for λ(k) =
k−1
k , where k ∈ N, and suitable 0 < τ < ρ < 1
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to be determined later. Note that from now on we will only consider rational τ
and ρ so that every payoff value of the game is rational.
S = V ∪ {a, b, c} are the strategies for the players where a, b, c /∈ V .
n = |V | is the number of nodes.
– u1(i, j) = ρ for all i, j ∈ V with (i, j) ∈ E .
– u1(i, j) = τ for all i, j ∈ V with (i, j) /∈ E .
– u1(z, a) = ρ for all z ∈ S − {b, c} .
– u1(a, i) = λ(k) for all i ∈ V .
– u1(y, i) = ρ for all y ∈ {b, c} and i ∈ V .
– u1(y, a) = τ for all y ∈ {b, c} .
– u1(z, y) = τ for all z ∈ S and y ∈ {b, c} .
Here is an example of the payoff matrix of the strategic game derived from
a graph with 3 nodes.
2
1 3
Fig. 1. The graph G.
Then the payoff matrix of the row-player is:
a b c 1 2 3
a ρ τ τ (k − 1)/k (k − 1)/k (k − 1)/k
b τ τ τ ρ ρ ρ
c τ τ τ ρ ρ ρ
1 ρ τ τ τ ρ τ
2 ρ τ τ ρ τ ρ
3 ρ τ τ τ ρ τ
The transpose of it is the payoff matrix of the column-player. In the sequel we
shall use two corollaries of the Motzkin and Strauss theorem, namely, Corollary
1 and Corollary 2.
Theorem 2. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph. The game Γk,τ,ρ(G) with
λ(k) = k−1k and
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– ρ ∈
(
1− 4(n+1)2 , 1− 1(n+1)2
]
and τ ∈
[
(1−ρ)(n−1), ρ−(1−√1− ρ)2
)
or
– ρ ∈
(
1− 1(n+1)2 , 1
)
and τ ∈
[
(1− ρ)(n− 1), (1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1n+1
)
has an ESS if and only if G has no clique of size k.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with maximum clique size d. We
consider the game Γk,τ,ρ(G) above. Suppose s is an ESS of Γk,τ,ρ(G).
For the reduction we will prove three claims by using contradiction, that
taken together show that the only possible ESS s of Γk,τ,ρ(G) is the pure strat-
egy a. Here we should note that these three claims hold not only for the afore-
mentioned intervals of τ and ρ, but for any τ, ρ ∈ R for which τ < ρ.
Claim (1). The support of any possible ESS of Γk,τ,ρ(G) does not contain b or
c (supp(s) ∩ {b, c} = ∅).
Suppose supp(s) ∩ {b, c} 6= ∅ .
Let t 6= s be a strategy with t(i) = s(i) for i ∈ V , t(y) = s(b) + s(c) and
t(y′) = 0 where y, y′ ∈ {b, c} such that y 6= y′ and s(y) = min{s(b), s(c)}. Since
u1(b, z) = u1(c, z) for all z ∈ S,
U1(t, s) =
∑
i∈V
t(i)U1(i, s) + (t(b) + t(c))U1(b, s) + t(a)U1(a, s) ,
U1(s, s) =
∑
i∈V
s(i)U1(i, s) + (s(b) + s(c))U1(b, s) + s(a)U1(a, s) ,
which yields U1(t, s) = U1(s, s) and so t is a best response to s. Also,
U1(s, t) =
∑
i∈V
s(i)U1(i, t) + (s(b) + s(c))U1(b, t) + s(a)U1(a, t) ,
U1(t, t) =
∑
i∈V
t(i)U1(i, t) + (t(b) + t(c))U1(b, t) + t(a)U1(a, t) ,
which yields U1(s, t) = U1(t, t). But this is a contradiction since it should be
U1(s, t) > U1(t, t) as s is an ESS.
Claim (2). The support of any possible ESS of Γk,τ,ρ(G) contains a (supp(s) *
V ).
Suppose supp(s) ⊆ V .
Then, we denote by AG the adjacency matrix of the graph G.
U1(s, s) =
∑
i,j∈V
s(i)s(j)u1(i, j) = x
TAG,τ,ρx
≤ τ + (ρ− τ)d− 1
d
(by Corollary 1)
< ρ = U1(b, s) for every ρ > τ .
But this is a contradiction since s is an ESS and therefore a NE. From Claim
(1) and Claim (2), it follows that a ∈ supp(s), i.e. s(a) > 0 .
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Claim (3). s(a) = 1 .
Suppose s(a) < 1 .
Since (s, s) is a NE, a is a best response to s and a 6= s. Then U1(s, a) =∑
z∈supp(s) s(z)u1(s, a) = ρ = U1(a, a). But this is also a contradiction since it
should be U1(s, a) > U1(a, a) as s is an ESS. Therefore, the only possible ESS
of Γk,τ,ρ(G) is the pure strategy a.
Now we show the following lemma, which concludes also the proof of Theorem
2.
Lemma 1. The game Γk,τ,ρ(G) with the requirements of Theorem 2 has an ESS
(strategy a) if and only if there is no clique of size k in graph G.
Proof. We consider two cases for k:
Case 1: d < k . Let t 6= a be a best response to a. Then supp(t) ⊆ V ∪ {a} .
Let r =
∑
i∈V t(i). So r > 0(t 6= a) and t(a) = 1 − r . Combining Corollary
1 and 2 we get,
U1(t, t)− U1(a, t) =
∑
i,j∈V
t(i)t(j)u1(i, j) + r · t(a) · ρ+
+ t(a) · r · k − 1
k
+ t(a)2 · ρ−
[
r · k − 1
k
+ t(a) · ρ
]
≤
[
τ + (ρ− τ)d− 1
d
]
r2 + r(1− r) · ρ+
+ (1− r)r k − 1
k
+ (1− r)2 · ρ− r k − 1
k
− (1− r) · ρ
=
[
τ + (ρ− τ)d− 1
d
]
r2 − k − 1
k
r2
=
r2
d
[
τ + ρ(d− 1)− dk − 1
k
]
=
r2
d
E , where E = τ + ρ(d− 1)− dk − 1
k
.
If we can show that E < 0 then strategy a is an ESS. We now show why
E < 0:
Let us define the following function,
f(k, d, ρ) = d
k − 1
k
− ρ(d− 1) , with the restrictions: k ≥ d+ 1, 1 ≤ d ≤ n
and ρ ∈ (0, 1) .
Then we define the function g(d, ρ):
g(d, ρ) = min
k
f(k, d, r) = d
d
d+ 1
− ρ(d− 1) = (1− ρ)(d− 1) + 1
d+ 1
. (1)
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By examining the first and second partial derivative with respect to variable
d, we find the minimum of function g(d, ρ):
h(ρ) = min
d
g(d, ρ) = ρ− (1−
√
1− ρ)2 , for d∗ = 1√
1− ρ − 1 . (2)
Now there are two subcases. The maximum clique size may be impossible to
reach the value of d∗, or it could reach it, depending on the size of n = |V | .
Subcase i) n < 1√
1−ρ − 1 or equivalently: ρ > 1− 1(n+1)2 .
From the partial derivatives of function g(d, ρ) with respect to variable d we
know that it is a strictly decreasing function for d < d∗. And given that d ≤ n,
from (1) we get:
h(ρ) = (1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1
n+ 1
, for 1− 1
(n+ 1)2
< ρ < 1 . (3)
Subcase ii) n ≥ 1√
1−ρ − 1 or equivalently: ρ ≤ 1− 1(n+1)2 .
By examining the first and second partial derivative with respect to variable
ρ, we find the plot of function h(ρ) to be:
As we can see, the maximum of h(ρ) is 12 and it is achieved when ρ =
3
4 .
Interval a) 34 < ρ ≤ 1− 1(n+1)2 .
The monotonicity of h(ρ) in this interval implies that its minimum is achieved
for ρ∗ = 1− 1(n+1)2 . Thus if we want a minimum independent of ρ, from (2) we
get:
min
ρ
h(ρ) = 1− 1
(n+ 1)2
−
(
1−
√
1−
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)2
))2
=
2n
(n+ 1)2
. (4)
Interval b) 0 < ρ ≤ 34 .
The monotonicity of h(ρ) in this interval implies that there is no minimum
point, but when ρ gets arbitrarily close to zero then h(ρ) goes arbitrarily close
to zero as well, i.e. limρ→0+ h(ρ) = 0 .
To sum up:
τ∗ = min
k,d
f(k, d, ρ) =

ρ− (1−√1− ρ)2 , if 0 < ρ ≤ 1− 1(n+1)2 , from (2)
(1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1n+1 , if 1− 1(n+1)2 < ρ < 1 , from (3)
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or if we want the minima to be independent of ρ when possible:
τ∗ = min
k,d,ρ
f(k, d, ρ) =

ρ− (1−√1− ρ)2 , if 0 < ρ ≤ 34
2n
(n+1)2 , if
3
4 < ρ ≤ 1− 1(n+1)2 , from (4)
1
n+1 , if 1− 1(n+1)2 < ρ < 1 , from (3).
Therefore, depending on the interval that ρ belongs to, we can demand τ to be
strictly less than τ∗ , making U1(t, t)−U1(a, t) negative. We conclude that when
d < k then strategy a is an ESS.
Case 2: d ≥ k . Let C ⊆ V be a clique of G of size k. Then t with t(i) = 1k for
i ∈ C and t(j) = 0 for j ∈ S \ C is a best response to a and t 6= a, and
U1(t, t) =
∑
i,j∈C
t(i)t(j)u1(i, j) =
1
k2
· (k − 1)k · ρ+ 1
k2
k · τ = (k − 1)ρ+ τ
k
,
U1(a, t) =
k − 1
k
.
Then,
U1(t, t)− U1(a, t) = 1
k
[
τ − (1− ρ)(k − 1)
]
=
1
k
E′ , where E′ = τ − (1− ρ)(k − 1) .
If E′ ≥ 0 then a cannot be an ESS. We explain why E′ ≥ 0:
Let’s define the following function:
y(k, ρ) = (1− ρ)(k − 1) , with the restrictions: k ≤ d and ρ ∈ (0, 1) .
Then we define the function z(d, ρ):
z(d, ρ) = max
k
y(k, ρ) = (1− ρ)(d− 1) ,
so,
τ∗∗ = max
d
z(d, ρ) = (1− ρ)(n− 1) .
Now, given that τ needs to be at least τ∗∗ but strictly less than τ∗ the
following should hold:
(1− ρ)(n− 1) < ρ− (1−
√
1− ρ)2 , or equivalently, ρ > 1− 4
(n+ 1)2
.
So we conclude that when d ≥ k then strategy a is not an ESS. This completes
the proof of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.
uunionsq
uunionsq
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2.2 An Interesting Consequence
An interesting consequence of the analysis above, is the fact that if we could
possess an algorithm, called DecESS, which decides in polynomial time whether
a game Γk,τ,ρ(G) has an ESS, then the maximum clique size of graph G can also
be found in polynomial time using the following binary search algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Binary clique search
1: min← 1 . Initialization
2: max← n
3: while (min 6= max) do . We have more than 1 candidates for max clique size
4: mid← d(min+max)/2e . Search in the middle of the set
5: if DecESS(Γmid,τ ′,ρ′(G))=”yes” then . By Theorem 2...
6: max← mid− 1 . ...max clique size is less than ”mid”
7: else . By Theorem 2...
8: min← mid . ...max clique size is at least ”mid”
9: return min . The clique size is ”min”
In this algorithm we supposed there is an algorithm, called DecESS, that
uses as input the game: Γmid,τ ′,ρ′(G), where themid value depends on the current
min and max values of the algorithm, and τ ′ and ρ′ are picked in the intervals:
– ρ′ ∈
(
1 − 4(max+1)2 , 1 − 1(max+1)2
]
and τ ′ ∈
[
(1 − ρ)(max − 1), ρ −
(1−√1− ρ)2
)
or
– ρ′ ∈
(
1 − 1(max+1)2 , 1
)
and τ ′ ∈
[
(1 − ρ)(max − 1), (1 − ρ)(max −
1) + 1max+1
)
,
for the current value of max in each loop of the algorithm. The output of De-
cESS is: ”yes”, if there exists an ESS in Γmid,τ ′,ρ′(G) and ”no”, otherwise. So
we construct a new game Γmid,τ,ρ(G) every time min or max (and therefore
mid) are changed. Note that while the binary search runs, the maximum pos-
sible clique size of the graph (max) changes, so, we can modify the intervals of
our τ ′ and ρ′ as if we had a new graph with |V | = max instead of n.
As the clique problem has been proved to be NP-complete, to find the
maximum clique size of a given graph (max-clique problem) is NP-hard, thus,
possession of the above mentioned algorithm would yield that P=NP.
To determine the time complexity of the Binary clique search algorithm
let’s suppose that the steps which DecESS needs are R(n) ∈ O(nw) for some
constant w. From the algorithm we can derive the recurrent relation for the steps
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needed:
T (m) = 4 +R(n) + T (dm2 e)
= 4 +R(n) + 4 +R(n) + T
(⌈
m
4
⌉)
= ...
(the steps of DecESS are not dependent on the size m of the search list)
and in general
T (m) = (4 +R(n))i+ T
(⌈m
2i
⌉)
.
The base case is:
T
(⌈m
2i
⌉)
= T (1)⇒
⌈m
2i
⌉
= 1⇒ i = dlog2me ,
so, the latter equation is:
T (m) = (4 +R(n))dlog2me+ T (1) .
Our initial condition is T (1) = 1 .
Also, m = n. (We wrote m instead of n above because the steps R(n) of
DecESS do not depend on the size m of the search list of each Binary clique
search’s loop, they only depend on the number of G’s vertices n = |V |.) So, if
we count the steps for the initialization of the variables along with the return
command, the steps needed by Binary clique search are:
T (n) = (4 +R(n))dlog2 ne+ 4 ,
which yields:
T (n) ∈ O(nw log2 n) .
To sum up, if we have a polynomial time algorithm DecESS which decides
if the game Γk,τ,ρ(G) has an ESS, then the max-clique problem is solvable
in polynomial time, as we can always reduce an undirected graph G = (V,E)
to dlog2 ne number of Γk,τ,ρ(G) games, each of them in polynomial time and
eventually find the maximum clique size of G in polynomial time using Binary
clique search.
All in all, supposing the reduction from the graph to the game requires O(nr)
time for some constant r (as shown by [2]), then, the assumption of a DecESS
in P yields that the max-clique problem requires O(nr+w log2 n) time and
P=NP.
Corollary 3. The ess problem with payoff values in the domains given in The-
orem 2 is coNP-hard.
Existence of ESS remains hard to decide for a wide range of payoff values 17
3 Extending the Reduction with Respect to λ(k)
We now prove a generalization of the latter reduction for λ(k) = 1 − 1kx , with
x ≥ 3:
Theorem 3. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph. The game Γ xk,τ,ρ(G) with
λ(k) = 1− 1kx , for x ≥ 3 and
– ρ ∈
(
1 + n
x−1−2x
2xnx−1(n−1) , 1 +
(n+1)x−n2x
2x(n+1)x(n−1)
]
and
τ ∈ [(1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− 1nx−1 , 1− 12x )
or
– ρ ∈
(
1 + (n+1)
x−n2x
2x(n+1)x(n−1) , +∞
)
and
τ ∈
[
(1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− 1nx−1 , (1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− n(n+1)x
)
has an ESS if and only if G has no clique of size k.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with maximum clique size d. We
consider the game Γk,τ,ρ(G) defined in Subsection 2.1, with the only difference
that now, we substitute payoffs of value k−1k with new payoffs
kx−1
kx , meaning
we make the change k ← kx. Suppose s is an ESS of Γ xk,τ,ρ(G).
In this case, the same analysis as in Subsection 2.1 is similarly applied up
to the point where we prove that the only possible ESS of Γ xk,τ,ρ(G) is the pure
strategy a. Now we proceed to show the following lemma, which concludes also
the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 2. The game Γ xk,τ,ρ(G) with the requirements of Theorem 3 has an ESS
(strategy a) if and only if there is no clique of size k in graph G.
Proof. We consider again two cases for k:
Case 1: d < k . Let t 6= a be a best response to a. Then supp(t) ⊆ V ∪ {a}.
Let r =
∑
i∈V t(i). So r > 0, (t 6= a) and t(a) = 1− r. Combining Corollary
1 and 2 we get,
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U1(t, t)− U1(a, t) =
∑
i,j∈V
t(i)t(j)u1(i, j) + r · t(a) · ρ+
+ t(a) · r · k
x − 1
kx
+ t(a)2 · ρ−
[
r · k
x − 1
kx
+ t(a) · ρ
]
≤
[
τ + (ρ− τ)d− 1
d
]
r2 + r(1− r) · ρ+
+ (1− r)r k
x − 1
kx
+ (1− r)2 · ρ− r k
x − 1
kx
− (1− r) · ρ
=
[
τ + (ρ− τ)d− 1
d
]
r2 − k
x − 1
kx
r2
=
r2
d
[
τ − (1− ρ)(d− 1)− (1− d
kx
)
]
=
r2
d
E , where E = τ − (1− ρ)(d− 1)− (1− d
kx
) .
If we can show that E < 0 then strategy a is an ESS. We show why E < 0:
Let’s define the following function:
f(k, d, ρ) = (1− ρ)(d− 1) + 1− d
kx
, with the restrictions: k ≥ d+ 1, 1 ≤ d ≤ n, x ≥ 3 .
Then we define the function g(d, ρ):
g(d, ρ) = min
k
f(k, d, r) = (1− ρ)(d− 1) + 1− d
(d+ 1)x
.
Now, the first two partial derivatives of g(d, ρ) with respect to variable d,
are:
∂g(d, ρ)
∂d
= (1− ρ) + (x− 1)d− 1
(d+ 1)x+1
∂2g(d, ρ)
∂d2
=
−x[(x− 1)d− 2]
(d+ 1)x+2
, which is non-positive for d ≥ 1, x ≥ 3 .
This means that function g has its minimum either for d = 1 or d = n:
g(1, ρ) = 1− 1
2x
g(n, ρ) = (1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− n
(n+ 1)x
If the minimum is g(1, ρ):
g(1, ρ) ≤ g(n, ρ), or equivalently, ρ ≤ 1 + (n+ 1)
x − n2x
2x(n+ 1)x(n− 1) .
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Then,
h(ρ) = min
d
g(d, ρ) = 1− 1
2x
.
If the minimum is g(n, ρ):
g(n, ρ) < g(1, ρ), or equivalently, ρ > 1 +
(n+ 1)x − n2x
2x(n+ 1)x(n− 1) .
Then,
h(ρ) = min
d
g(d, ρ) = (1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− n
(n+ 1)x
.
So, following the notation we used in Subsection 2.1:
τ∗ = min
k,d
f(k, d, ρ) =

1− 12x , if ρ ≤ 1 + (n+1)
x−n2x
2x(n+1)x(n−1)
(1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− n(n+1)x , if ρ > 1 + (n+1)
x−n2x
2x(n+1)x(n−1)
Therefore, we can demand τ to be strictly less than τ∗, making U1(t, t)−U1(a, t)
negative. We conclude that when d < k then strategy a is an ESS.
Case 2: d ≥ k . Let C ⊆ V be a clique of G of size k. Then t with t(i) = 1k for
i ∈ C and t(j) = 0 for j ∈ S \ C is a best response to a and t 6= a, and
U1(t, t) =
∑
i,j∈C
t(i)t(j)u1(i, j) =
1
k2
· (k − 1)k · ρ+ 1
k2
k · τ = (k − 1)ρ+ τ
k
,
U1(a, t) =
kx − 1
kx
.
Then,
U1(t, t)− U1(a, t) = 1
k
[
τ − (1− ρ)(k − 1)− (1− 1
kx−1
)
]
=
1
k
E′ , where E′ = τ − (1− ρ)(k − 1)− (1− 1
kx−1
) .
If E′ ≥ 0 then a cannot be an ESS. We explain why E′ ≥ 0:
Let’s define the following function:
y(k, ρ) = (1− ρ)(k − 1) + 1− 1
kx−1
, with the restrictions: k ≤ d .
Then we define the function z(d, ρ):
z(d, ρ) = max
k
y(k, ρ) = (1− ρ)(d− 1) + 1− 1
dx−1
,
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so,
τ∗∗ = max
d
z(d, ρ) = (1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− 1
nx−1
.
Now, given that τ needs to be at least τ∗∗ but strictly less than τ∗ the
following should hold:
(1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− 1
nx−1
< 1− 1
2x
, or equivalently, ρ > 1 +
nx−1 − 2x
2xnx−1(n− 1) .
So we conclude that when d ≥ k then strategy a is not an ESS. This completes
the proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 3.
uunionsq
uunionsq
Corollary 4. The ess problem with payoff values in the domains given in The-
orem 3 is coNP-hard.
4 Our Main Result
Now we can prove our main theorem:
Theorem 4. Any reduction as in Theorem 3 for x = x0 ≥ 3 from the com-
plement of the clique problem to the ess problem is robust under arbitrary
perturbations of values in the intervals:
τ ∈
[
1− 1
2x0
−D, 1− 1
2x0
−D +B
)
,
ρ ∈
(
1 +
(n+ 1)x0 − n2x0
2x0(n+ 1)x0(n− 1) , 1 +
(n+ 1)x0 − n2x0
2x0(n+ 1)x0(n− 1) +A
)
,
λ ∈
[
1− 1
kx0
, 1− 1
kx1
]
,
where x1 ∈ (x0, x0 logn(n+ 1)), C = (n+1)
x0−nx1
nx1−1(n+1)x0 (n−1) , D = C(n − 1), any
A ∈ (0, C) and B = (C −A)(n− 1).
Proof. We denote three partitions of the game’s payoff matrix U : Uτ , Uρ, Uλ
disjoint sets, with Uτ ∪Uρ∪Uλ = U and values τ, ρ, λ of their entries respectively.
Each set’s entries have the same value. For every λ ∈ [1− 1kx0 , 1− 1kx1 ] there is
a x = − logk(1 − λ) in the interval [x0, x1] such that λ = 1 − 1kx , where x0 ≥ 3
and x1 ∈ (x0, x0 logn(n+ 1)). We will show that, for this x, any reduction with
the values of τ, ρ in the respective intervals stated in Theorem 3, is valid.
In Figure 2, we show the validity area of τ depending on ρ with parameter
x, due to Theorem 3. The thin and thick plots bound the validity area (shaded)
for x = x0 and x = x1 respectively.
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τ
ρ1
1 + n
x1−1−2x1
2x1nx1−1(n−1)
1 + n
x0−1−2x0
2x0nx0−1(n−1)
1 + (n+1)
x1−n2x1
2x1 (n+1)x1 (n−1)
1 + (n+1)
x0−n2x0
2x0 (n+1)x0 (n−1)
1
1− 12x1
1− 12x0
1− 12x1 − (n+1)
x1−nx1
nx1−1(n+1)x1
1− 12x0 − (n+1)
x0−nx0
nx0−1(n+1)x0
Fig. 2. The validity area of τ and ρ with parameter x.
While x increases, the parallel lines of the lower and upper bound of τ move
to the right, the horizontal line of the upper bound of τ moves up, and the
left acute angle as well as the top obtuse angle of the plot move to the left (by
examination of the monotonicity of those bounds with respect to x).
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The lower bound of τ for an x = x′ > x0 equals the upper bound of τ for
x = x0, when x
′ = x0 logn(n+ 1). Thus, for all x ∈ (x0,x0 logn(n + 1)) there
is a non-empty intersection between the validity areas. We have picked
an x = x1 ∈ (x0, x0 logn(n+ 1)).
In Figure 3, we show a zoom-in of the intersection of the validity areas of
Figure 2. Let the intersection of lines: 1− 12x0 , (1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− 1nx1−1 be at
point ρ = ρC .
Then,
(1− ρC)(n− 1) + 1− 1
nx1−1
= 1− 1
2x0
or equivalently, ρC = 1− 1
2x0(n− 1) −
1
nx1−1(n− 1) .
So,
C = 1 +
(n+ 1)x0 − n2x0
2x0(n+ 1)x0(n− 1) − ρC , or equivalently, C =
(n+ 1)x0 − nx1
nx1−1(n+ 1)x0(n− 1) .
From the upper bound of τ as a function of ρ we can see that tanϕ = n− 1.
Thus,
D = C tanϕ, or equivalently, D =
(n+ 1)x0 − nx1
nx1−1(n+ 1)x0
.
Now we can pick any A ∈ (0, C). So, it must be
B = (C −A) tanϕ, or equivalently, B = (n− 1)(C −A).
For the rectangle with sides A,B shown in Figure 3, the reduction is valid
for all x ∈ [x0, x1], thus for all λ ∈
[
1− 1kx0 , 1− 1kx1
]
. This completes the proof
of Theorem 4. uunionsq
5 Conclusions and Further Work
In this work we introduce the notion of reduction robustness under arbitrary
perturbations within an interval and we provide a generalized reduction based
on the one in [2] that proves coNP-hardness of ess. We demonstrate that our
generalised reduction is robust, thus showing that the hardness of the problem
is preserved even after certain arbitrary perturbations of the payoff values of
the derived game. As a future work we would like to examine the robustness of
reductions for other hard problems, especially game-theoretic ones.
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τ
ρ
1− 12x0
(1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− 1
nx1−1
1 + (n+1)
x0−n2x0
2x0 (n+1)x0 (n−1)
ρC
D
A
C
B
(1− ρ)(n− 1) + 1− n(n+1)x0
ϕ
Fig. 3. Detail of the validity areas’ intersection and the ρ, τ robust area (shaded).
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